Judul : Nigeria's 2014 Reckoning
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Nigeria's 2014 Reckoning
The occurrences and ambiance from the last few days in Nigeria seem strangely and unsettlingly similar. They evoke the disabling instability and powerlessness (and worse) experienced in 2014 and 2015 during Goodluck Jonathan's presidency.
Three challenges are occurring almost at the same time. First, there is a revival of Boko Haram's actions. Second, there is a worrying increase in large-scale abductions in the northwest and north central regions. Third, we are witnessing more organized robbery along major transportation routes across most areas of the country. Each of these issues has occurred previously, but they rarely reach high levels at the same time unless there has been a fundamental change. This alone is cause for concern.
We have returned to tallying the missing children, viewing unstable videos of frightened students, hearing heartbroken parents on TV, and listening to federal officials who appear permanently stunned into inaction. The sense of familiarity is disturbing.
This week, armed criminals attacked a school in Kebbi State, taking many girls hostage, an incident that shocked the nation. Just days later, another group of attackers entered Papiri village in Niger State and kidnapped students who were getting ready for their morning classes.
The attack in Niger State had a personal impact on me because the village leader of Papiri is my paternal second cousin. His mother is my father's first cousin. In the Borgu culture, we are regarded as cross cousins and thus "joking friends." I have attempted to contact him since the news of the kidnapping surfaced but have not been successful.
At the same time, jihadist violence in the northeast has returned with a disturbingly familiar intensity and increased severity. The Islamic State West Africa Province and remnants of Boko Haram have reorganized around the Lake Chad region. They are launching attacks on civilian areas and security facilities with renewed energy. From Bama to Marte, residents speak of ongoing fear at night, as though nothing has changed since the height of Boko Haram's power a decade ago.
I experienced the intense anger of former President Muhammadu Buhari's supporters in early 2018 when, in a column published on February 24, 2018 titled "Bursting the Myth of Buhari's Boko Haram 'Success'," I highlighted that Boko Haram seemed to have been defeated not due to government actions, but because the group had been "weakened by a deeply divisive and violent internal conflict." It seems the group has managed to resolve its internal disagreements enough to carry out coordinated attacks on its targets.
Alongside this revival, there has been a transformation of kidnapping into a national enterprise. What began as a strategy used by insurgents has been replicated, improved, and turned into a profitable activity by criminal groups in the northwest and north central regions, later spreading to the south.
Independent monitoring systems indicate that billions of naira have been transferred via ransom payments during the last ten years, with recent findings highlighting a well-organized kidnapping industry that includes investors, transportation systems, sources, mediators, and individuals involved in money laundering. What Nigeria previously referred to as banditry has evolved into a calculated business with consistent income sources and varied risks.
Indeed, the current national mood mirrors that of the Jonathan era. However, the crisis now is more profound and widespread.
The widespread feeling of hopelessness, powerlessness, and outrage across the nation mirrors the late Jonathan administration period, when Boko Haram raised its banners over large parts of Borno and Yobe. Chibok turned into a worldwide symbol of Nigerian mismanagement. Today, the emotionally powerful but factually wrong idea of a "Christian genocide" that excludes Muslims has emerged as the main slogan to draw international focus on Nigeria's increasing instability.
In 2014, Bola Ahmed Tinubu stood as the strongest voice of the opposition. He criticized Goodluck Jonathan for his inefficiency and lack of resolve, called for his resignation, and argued that a president who permitted any region of Nigeria to come under rebel control had lost his right to govern. He was not the only one. The opposition developed a political image based on Jonathan’s failure to manage insecurity, and many Nigerians accepted this viewpoint.
By 2025, the situation has changed. Tinubu is now in the presidential role. However, armed groups have established de facto control over areas ranging from Sokoto to Zamfara and parts of Niger and Kwara. The large-scale kidnappings of students, which once represented Jonathan's downfall, are now happening more frequently and with growing fear under Tinubu's leadership. The same constitutional framework that limited Jonathan's ability to act swiftly continues to restrict Tinubu. The same centralized federal police force, which Jonathan was unable to reform, remains unchanged. The same group of political opponents demanding resignation has returned, this time targeting Tinubu.
To grasp why Nigeria is once more caught in this cycle, one needs to examine the motivations involved. In 2014, Boko Haram survived through theft, plunder, cattle stealing, bank attacks, and forced taxes on communities under its control. As time passed, the insurgency split into different groups. The Islamic State West Africa Province became a faction that imposed taxes on traders, herders, and fishermen around the Lake Chad region with a level of consistent structure. Meanwhile, Boko Haram's group continued with unpredictable violence that focused on shocking acts and fear. Their internal conflict weakened both factions but did not eliminate the insurgent social systems that had become established in northeast Nigeria.
In the northwest, a distinct conflict-driven economy took root. What started as localized confrontations between armed herders and agricultural communities transformed into a wide-reaching network of banditry. Criminal organizations found that abducting individuals provided greater financial benefits compared to stealing livestock or engaging in territorial conflicts.
Eventually, the activities became more organized. Negotiators appeared. Safe houses and detention camps were established. Ransom money was transferred via unofficial financial routes. Unscrupulous middlemen collected fees. A network of accomplices, facilitators, and passive beneficiaries thrived.
By 2020, experts characterized Nigeria's kidnapping industry as a well-established market with consistent seasonal patterns. As money became less available, criminal organizations turned to stealing crops or imposing fees on miners. When security forces targeted a particular route, criminals moved to nearby states. Once the public became accustomed to individual kidnappings, gangs began conducting large-scale abductions to regain leverage. The situation evolved into a self-perpetuating crisis.
What maintains this national theater of uncertainty is not complicated. A centralized and sluggish security system prevents governors from addressing emergencies within their own states. Corruption depletes operational resources and encourages certain individuals to extend instability. High levels of youth unemployment in rural areas generate a continuous supply of recruits for jihadist and bandit groups. Inadequate intelligence systems and politically influenced law enforcement lead to a lack of accountability. Communities that work with the government are subjected to retaliatory attacks without proper protection. Oversimplified stories, whether based on religion or ethnicity, hinder genuine analysis.
However, this cycle is not permanent. Nigeria requires real decentralization of law enforcement authority so that states can establish responsible and effective security forces to support federal agencies. The kidnapping industry should be addressed as a financial crime issue, requiring monitoring of ransom movements, strict implementation of anti-money laundering laws, and prosecution of urban accomplices.
The armed forces should eliminate procurement fraud and focus on intelligence-based operations that safeguard civilians instead of emphasizing casualty figures. Educational institutions require genuine protective facilities, not hollow promises of safe schools. The government must restore confidence within communities by holding abusers accountable and maintaining a steady presence rather than conducting occasional raids.
Nigeria still avoids difficult but essential choices. An example is the employment of foreign military contractors to assist in counterinsurgency efforts. In 2015, Goodluck Jonathan engaged South African and Eastern European mercenaries who contributed to some of the most notable territorial advances against Boko Haram in recent years. Muhammadu Buhari terminated the agreement due to excessive nationalistic pride, and the progress disappeared. Considering the current level of threats, Nigeria needs to reevaluate the possibility of obtaining specialized external assistance with appropriate supervision. The priority should be preserving lives, not safeguarding political egos.
Ten years ago, Nigerians came together with a basic request that their children remain secure in schools and their villages free from attacks. A decade on, they are making the same appeal. If it was reasonable for Tinubu to state in 2014 that no leader should allow Nigerian communities to be taken over by non-state armed groups, then it is equally valid to say the same thing to him today.
Nigerians deserve a nation where sending their children to school is not seen as an act of hope in divine grace. They desire a government that views large-scale kidnappings not as an annoying stain, but as a shocking emergency. They wish for an end to a nightmare that seems designed to unfold every decade.
This is a cycle that can be disrupted. Whether it will be, remains the central issue facing the nation.
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