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The myth of coup-proofing in Zimbabwe's volatile politics
Tendai Ruben Mbofana
The selection of former Major General, now Lieutenant General, Walter Tapfumanei as the new head of the Zimbabwe National Army (ZNA) has sparked renewed political discussion.
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He takes on the role left empty by General Emmanuel Matutu, who, at the age of seventy-three, has been promoted to head the Zimbabwe Defence Forces, succeeding General Phillip Valerio Sibanda following his retirement.
As is typically the case in Zimbabwean politics, the issue goes beyond mere military changes.
It revolves around authority – who holds it, who is afraid of losing it, and who is getting ready for the next clash in the extended and frequently dangerous struggle for dominance over the government.
Numerous analysts swiftly determined that President Emmerson Mnangagwa had recently executed a clever maneuver, a crucial step to "prevent a coup" by appointing a loyal friend as the head of the military.
According to this view, the promotion of Tapfumanei, historically linked to intelligence activities and said to be key to the disputed FAZ system during the 2023 elections, was a deliberate move to eliminate any remaining impression of military support for Vice President Constantino Chiwenga.
For many years, Chiyenga has been the subject of speculation regarding his desire for the presidency, and it is commonly thought that he still holds considerable power in parts of the military that he previously led.
For some analysts, the reshuffle by Mnangagwa – which also sees Tapfumanei return to the military framework where he might soon be elevated to ZDF Commander – was viewed as a courageous move.
However, these conclusions, despite being appealing, overlook the more profound insights from Zimbabwe's political history.
Anyone who believes that putting allies in charge of the military represents real coup-proofing is dangerously naive.
Zimbabwe's political past, similar to much of Africa's, has consistently shown that in politics, there are no lasting allies or lasting adversaries—only enduring interests.
This is a lesson that Robert Mugabe learned too late.
For many years, he kept company with individuals he thought were faithful, including Mnangagwa.
He disregarded warnings from Professor Jonathan Moyo — including the 2017 "Blue Ocean" presentation, which presented proof of an impending military coup — but those long-relied-upon allies were actually conspiring to oust him.
Mugabe rejected the warning as yet another effort by a "Mafikizolo" to create unrest.
However, not long after, it was exactly those so-called allies—Mnangagwa and the military leaders—who removed him from power during the November 2017 coup.
Even at the height of conflicts between Grace Mugabe's G40 and the Lacoste group supporting Mnangagwa, Chiwenga was generally seen as faithful to Mugabe, up until the point when he wasn't.
Loyalty within Zimbabwean politics is consistently dependent, temporary, and influenced by the changing circumstances of individual survival.
It is thus politically myopic to assume that Mnangagwa has solidified his position solely by placing Tapfumanei at the top of the military.
The proximity of Tapfumanei to Mnangagwa at present does not ensure an alliance in the future.
Individuals holding military or political authority frequently shift their allegiance as soon as they sense improved prospects or enhanced safety on the opposing side.
The same military leaders who had supported Mugabe for years turned their backs on him once they felt their own prospects were more secure under Mnangagwa — or due to the looming danger posed by Grace Mugabe, who was generally perceived as preparing to assume control following Mnangagwa's dismissal only weeks prior.
Why would today's military leaders be any different?
The political scene in Zimbabwe continues to be very uncertain.
The concept of ensuring loyalty through promotions and appointments suggests a degree of faithfulness that historical evidence repeatedly demonstrates is absent.
There is also a basic error in the common belief that any potential future coup in Zimbabwe would be similar to the 2017 takeover.
That occurrence was fueled by conflicts among the ruling class – a struggle within the political elite regarding who would take over.
It did not emerge from widespread hardship or national discontent.
It involved a reorganization within the governing elite.
As a result, it was guided by generals who were well-nourished, well-connected, and well-equipped, battling for dominance over the supply of provisions, rather than for the average person.
This leads us to a frequently neglected truth.
In Africa, the majority of coups have been initiated not by high-ranking military officials, but by mid-level and lower-ranking officers – individuals who experience the daily challenges of the broader population more directly.
Captain Ibrahim Traoré from Burkina Faso, who climbed from a low position to take control, did so not due to being part of the established elite, but because he was addressing intense public frustration.
In Mali, Captain Amadou Sanogo, another young officer, overthrew President Amadou Toumani Touré in 2012, demonstrating that coups frequently begin with discontented officers who are more connected to the everyday experiences of the population than the senior military leadership.
In Burkina Faso, Captain Thomas Sankara took control in 1983 not from within the established elite, but as a lower-ranking officer driven by public anger towards the ruling group, highlighting once more that coups frequently originate with officers of mid- or lower rank rather than wealthy generals.
In Madagascar, Colonel Michael Randrianirina has recently assumed control, once more highlighting that coups frequently originate from officers who lack the advantages that generals typically possess.
These are people whose experiences reflect the disappointments of everyday people and who do not benefit from the favoritism systems that ensure high-ranking officials live comfortably.
The idea that Zimbabwe can be protected from coups by elevating specific generals fails to grasp the usual course of coup attempts.
Should a new uprising occur in Zimbabwe due to increasing economic hardship faced by its citizens, it is unlikely that those who reside in comfort, benefit from government support, and have strong reasons to preserve the current situation would lead it.
Military leaders might engage in conflict for their personal political survival or to gain control over government resources, but they would not mobilize in support of an oppressed group.
An insurrection fueled by widespread hardship is more probable to originate from lower and middle-level officers whose concerns are more in line with the people's complaints.
In such a situation, moving around some high-ranking officers would provide absolutely no safeguard.
The recent reshuffle by Mnangagwa is therefore not a brilliant move.
It's a common political strategy – the effort of a leader facing challenges to gather people around him whom he thinks he can rely on.
However, trust within Zimbabwean politics has consistently been based on exchanges and short-lived.
Mugabe made an error by trusting individuals he believed were loyal, and Mnangagwa could be making the same mistake.
The authority in Zimbabwe changes based on where interests align, rather than where positions are assigned.
The rise of Tapfumanei could benefit Mnangagwa at this moment.
However, tomorrow, as history has repeatedly demonstrated, the individuals he considers as allies might be the ones who determine that it's time for him to leave.
I present this not as a factual statement, but as my personal viewpoint on the present situation in Zimbabwe.
- Tendai Ruben Mbofana is a champion for social justice and an author. You are welcome to WhatsApp or call: +263715667700 | +263782283975, or send an email:mbofana.tendairuben73@gmail.com, or visit website: https://mbofanatendairuben.news.blog/
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